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ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
the Abbott case.24 Under the present statute no application is ad-
missible in evidence, to decide either an extrinsic or intrinsic question,
if the application is not attached to the insurance policy. The amend-
ment only provides for applications and makes no mention of any
other writings such as is made in the previously enacted part of the
section. Therefore, it follows that writings other than applications
are admissible in evidence when it is necessary to decide an extrinsic
question, even though they are not attached to the policy, particularly
since both the majority and the dissenting opinions in the Abbott
case 25 agreed on this point and it has not been disturbed by the
Legislature.
The insurance corporations may see fit to contest Section 142 as
being unconstitutional, on the ground that it interferes with their
contract rights under the United States Constitution. The insurance
business is quasi-public in character because of its vast effect on all
classes of people and their property. Therefore, it is competent for
the state by virtue of its police power to regulate and control both the
business and the contracts.2 6The principle underlying former Section 58, that the insurance
policy should .contain the entire contract, is a sound principle for the
protection of the public and its extension by Section 142 to insurance
policies other than for life is a further indication of the legislative
intention to add more weight to the unbalanced bargaining power of
the insured.
CATHERINE GREENFIELD.
DESIGNATION OF PARTICULAR INSURANCE AGENT PROHIBITED.
-The right to make contracts is protected by the "due process"
clause of the Federal Constitution.1 The courts have guarded few
rights more zealously, being ever on the alert to prevent an undue
invasion of this guarantee.2 However, in the same breath, they have
constantly reiterated their holding that the right is not absolute, that
it must be restrained when the public welfare demands it,3 and legis-
lation to that effect will be upheld as constitutional.4
24 281 N. Y. 375, 25 N. E. (2d) 141 (1939).
25 Ibid.
26 CADY, THE LAW OF INSURANCE (3d ed. 1934) 79.
1 U. S. CONsT. AMEND. XIV, § 1; Adkins, et al. v. Children's Hospital, 261
U. S. 525, 43 Sup. Ct. 394 (1923); German Alliance Ins. Co. v. Barnes, 189
Fed. 769 (C. C. Kan. 1933).
2 Chas. Wolff Packing Co.'v. The Court of Industrial Relations of the
State of Kansas, 262 U. S. 522, 43 Sup. Ct. 630 (1923) ; Liberty Warehouse
Co. v. Burley Tobacco Growers Co-operative Ass'n, 276 U. S. 71, 48 Sup. Ct.
291 (1928) ; Hardware Dealers Mutual Fire Ins. Co. v. Glidden Co., et al., 284
U. S. 151, 52 Sup. Ct. 69 (1931).
3 Advance Rumely Thresher Co., Inc. v. Jackson, 287 U. S. 283, 53 Sup.
Ct. 133 (1932).
4 West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U. S. 379, 57 Sup. Ct. 578 (1937).
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Recently the New York Legislature amended the Penal Law,
inserting a new section therein, whereby it is made the law of the
state that: "* * * no trustee, director, officer, agent or other employee
of any bank, or banking institution, or of any insurance corporation
or association, or of any other corporation or company engaged in
the business of lending money on the security of real property shall
require, as a condition precedent to loaning money upon the security
of a mortgage upon real property, that the owner of the property to
whom the money is to be loaned, negotiate any policy of insurance
covering such real property through a particular insurance agent or
broker or brokers". 5 It appears that the Legislature has undeniably
restricted the right of the lending party to contract. Although the
Insurance Law prohibits the granting of rebates by insurance com-
panies or their agents,6 it is apparent that the lender can, nevertheless,
gain substantial benefit, even if only indirectly, from his exercise of
the power to name the insurance broker through whom the prospec-
tive borrower is to procure his insurance.
Justification for this legislation is found in a long line of decisions
dealing with similar restrictive statutes.7 These cases would seem to
indicate that, although the courts regard the right to contract as a
liberty or property right,8 it is, nonetheless, not to be considered as
an absolute right, but a qualified one which is subject to reasonable
restraint in the interest of the public welfare.9 This restraint is ac-
complished by the use of the police power.'0 It becomes important
to examine the concept of the police power to see if it is sufficiently
broad to encompass the instant legislation. As was said by the court
in Panhandle Eastern Pipe Line Co. v. State Highway Commission,"
"The police power of a state while not susceptible of definition with
circumstantial precision, must be exercised within a limited ambit and
is subordinate to constitutional limitations. It springs from the obli-
gation of the state to protect its citizens and provide for the safety
and good order of society. Under it there is no unrestricted authority
to accomplish whatever the public may presently desire. It is the
G N. Y. PENAL LAw § 442-a (L. 1940, c. 91).
6N. Y. INs. LAW § 188.
7 Holden v. Hardy, 169 U. S. 366, 18 Sup. Ct. 383 (1898) ; Knoxville Iron
Co. v. Harbison, 183 U. S. 13, 22 Sup. Ct. 1 (1901) (regulating the redemption
of store orders issued for wages) ; Selover, Bates & Co. v. Walsh, 226 U. S.
112, 33 Sup. Ct. 69 (1912) (regulating contracts for the sale of real estate) ;
Sturges & Burns Mfg. Co. v. Beauchamp, 231 U. S. 320, 34 Sup. Ct. 60 (1913)
(prohibiting child labor); N. Y. Central R.,.R. v. White, 243 U. S. 188, 37 Sup.
Ct 247 (1917) (establishing a syitem of compulsory workmen's compensation) ;
Banting v. Oregon, 243 U. S. 426 (1917) (prescribing hours of labor in certain
occupations).8 Highland v. Russell Car & Snow Plow Co., 279 U. S. 253, 49 Sup. Ct.
314 (1929) ; Bayside Fish Flour Co. v. Gentry, 297 U. S. 422, 56 Sup. Ct. 513
(1936).
9 St. Louis R. R. v. Paul, 173 U. S. 404, 19 Sup. Ct. 419 (1899).
10 Knoxville Iron Co. v. Harbison, 183 U. S. 13, 22 Sup. Ct. 1 (1901).
11294 U. S. 613, 622, 55 Sup. Ct. 563 (1935).
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governmental power of self protection and permits reasonable regu-
lation of rights and property in particulars essential to the preserva-
tion of the community from injury."
It should be noted that the Constitution does not speak of free-
dom of contract. It speaks of the liberty of contract and prohibits
the deprivation of that liberty without due process of law.12 This
liberty is subject to such restraint as best subserves the general wel-
fare of the people. 13 Regulation thus adopted and which is reasonable
in regard to the subject restrained is due process as that term is in-
terpreted by the courts.14 However, freedom is the general rule and
restraint the exception.' 5  The exercise of legislative authority to
abridge it can only be justified by exceptional circumstances. 16 The
attitude of the courts was summarized in Chicago, B. & Q. R. R. v.
McGuire,17 'vherein it was said: " * * * Freedom of contract is a
qualified and not an absolute right. There is no absolute freedom to
do as one wills or to contract as one chooses. The guaranty of liberty
does not withdraw from legislative supervision that wide department
of activity which consists of the making of contracts, or deny to gov-
ernment the power to provide restrictive safeguards. Liberty implies
the absence of arbitrary restraint, not immunity from reasonable regu-
lation and prohibitions imposed in the interest of the community."
An examination of the statute itself discloses its most significant
aspect, viz., that its prohibition applies only to the business of
" * * * any bank or banking institution, or of any insurance corpo-
ration or association, or of any other corporation * * * ".18 The
statute evidently does not purport to regulate individual lenders.
They would seem to have been excluded by implication. Perhaps an
explanation for this restriction on the scope of the statute is to be
found in the New York Constitution where the Legislature reserves
to itself the right to repeal, alter, or amend any corporate charter. 19
On this ground alone the constitutionality of the enactment can prob-
ably be well defended.
It is submitted that the police power reserved to the states is
sufficiently broad to make this statute applicable'to individual as well
as corporate borrowers. The courts cannot set it aside on the ground
that it is unnecessary, for what makes for the general welfare is a
12 U. S. CoNST. AMEND. XIV, § 1.
13 See note 9, supra.
14 See note 4, supra.
'15 Adkins, et al. v. Children's Hospital, 261 U. S. 525, 43 Sup. Ct. 394
(1923).
1S Chas. Wolff Packing Co. v. The Court of Industrial Relations of the
State of Kansas, 262 U. S. 522, 43 Sup. Ct. 630 (1923)
17 Chicago, B. & Q. R. R. v. McGuire, 219 U. S. 549, 567, 31 Sup. Ct. 259(1911).
18 N. Y. PENAL LAW § 442-a (L. 1940, c. 91).
'19 N. Y. CoNsT. AMEND. X, § 1; N. Y. Central R. R. v. Williams, 199
N. Y. 108, 92 N. E. 404 (1910) (a corporate charter may be amended by a
general act which does not specifically refer to such charter).
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matter of legislative judgment and the judicial review is limited to
power and excludes policy.
20
ALEXANDER VITALE.
STATUTORY LIABILITY OF PARTNERSHIP FOR FAILURE TO FILE
CERTIFICATE.-A partnership is an association of two or more persons
to carry on as co-owners a business for profit.' The word person in-
cludes individuals, partnerships, corporations, and other associations.
2
Thus it becomes apparent that the articles of partnership may bring
together any number of persons to carry on in the commercial com-
munity. With the law established that an action against a partnership
is an action against a group of individuals, rather than an entity, it
becomes the very difficult task of a third party seeking relief to ascer-
tain the two or more persons constituting the partnership.3 To al-
leviate this task the legislature has enacted that persons conducting
businesses under an assumed name shall file in the office of the county
clerk a certificate setting forth the real name or names of the persons
conducting said business.4 The step was taken to protect third parties
dealing with fictitious or assumed named businesses. The statute
clearly includes partnerships carrying on under assumed names, but
a firm name may be a true but incomplete designation. For example,
"Smith & Jones" may be the firm name of a partnership consisting
of Smith, Jones and Brown, the latter's name not appearing in the
firm designation. In view of the fact that Brown's financial resources
make him a desirable party defendant, a plaintiff in order to ascer-
tain his relationship to the firm may have to wander deep into his ac-
tion before learning that the firm "Smith & Jones" consisted of three
partners. To overcome this needless hardship the New York Legis-
20 German Alliance Ins. Co. v. Lewis, 233 U. S. 389, 34 Sup. Ct. 612 (1914).
1 N. Y. PART. LAW § 10.
2 N. Y. PART. LAW § 2. The word "person" as defined by this section does
not give corporations the right to enter into partnerships either with other
corporations or with individuals. Op. Atty. Gen. 230 (1935), "A partnership
and a corporation are incongruous." Malory v. Hanaur Oil Works, 86 Tenn.
598, 8 S. W. 396, 399 (1888).
3 In actions based on contracts made with a partnership, all partners should
be made parties defendants. Alaska Banking and Safe Deposit Co. v. Van
Wyck, 146 App. Div. 5, 130 N. Y. Supp. 563 (1st Dept. 1911). Of course, a
failure to join an active partner is by no means fatal. Where for any cause a
partner has not been joined as defendant, the plaintiff may maintain a separate
action upon the same demand against such omitted partner. See N. Y. Civ.
PRAc. Acr § 1201.
In actions based on tort the same holds true. Hyde v. Lesser, 93 App. Div.
320, 87 N. Y. Supp. 878 (lst Dept. 1904); Wood v. Proudman, 122 App. Div.
826, 107 N. Y. Supp. 757 (1st Dept. 1907); Maxwell v. Martin, 130 App. Div.
80, 114 N. Y. Supp. 349 (lst Dept. 1909).
4 N. Y. PENAL LAW § 440.
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